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Comments
Physical Presence in Cyberspace:
As Electronic Commerce Takes Off, Does Quill
Leave Local Merchants in the Dust?
During the 1990s, computer science has dramatically changed the
way people learn, work, communicate, and trade. The Internet has
emerged as one of the most influential and extensive technologies avail-
able to date.' When the United States government granted public access
to the Internet ("Net") in 1991, it was a relatively unknown communi-
cation network accessible to only a small group of scientists and academi-
ans.' Once commerce began to tap its vast potential, the driving force of
the market quickly shaped the Net into a thriving commercial super-
highway.
Today, the Net functions as a powerful tool for conducting business-
to-business as well as business-to-consumer transactions. In fact, some
companies, such as Amazon.com,3 have abandoned traditional methods
of trade altogether and operate entirely on-line. The use of electronic
networks allows an enterprise to operate from any location, provide un-
interrupted service and customer support, increase market area, increase
1. The Internet presently links more than 150 million people worldwide. World Wide Web
User Statistics (visited Jan. 19, 1999) <http://www.why-not.com/company/stats.htm> (citing
estimates reported in a Gartner Group survey at http://www.gartner.com/whatsnew/inettv.html).
2. NOEL ESTABROOK, TEACH YOURSELF THE INTERNET IN 24 HOURS 16-17 (1997). Origi-
nally known as ARPAnet, the Net started in 1973 as a communications research project initi-
ated by the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. The goal of the project was to
develop communication rules, called protocols, to enable computer networks to exchange in-
formation. Id. at 16.
3. Amazon.com is a large online bookseller that does not operate retail stores or carry an
inventory. DAVID KOSIUR, UNDERSTANDING ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 5 (1997).
4. Id.
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cost efficiency, operate several different ventures at once, and test new
ideas.' Although electronic commerce offers many benefits, states face
the problem of collecting sales and use taxes for goods and services pur-
chased on-line. The United States Supreme Court decision, Quill Corpo-
ration v. North Dakota,6 requires that a nonlocal seller have a physical
presence before a state can compel it to collect and remit use tax!
Net transactions take place over a vast network of telephone lines
and are not subject to geographical or physical boundaries. Thus, an out-
of-state seller may advertise its goods and services over the Net using an
electronic storefront and not be compelled to collect and remit use tax
for sales made to in-state residents.
This comment explores whether the physical presence test enunci-
ated in Quill has outlived its usefulness within the context of the elec-
tronic storefront. The following paragraphs demonstrate that the Quill
decision creates hardships for, and discriminates against, merchants who
maintain physical presences within the taxing state. Part I provides an
introduction to electronic commerce and the Net. Parts II and III discuss
sales and use taxes, respectively. Part IV outlines the development of
decisions regarding the collection and remittance of use tax from out-of-
state sellers. Part V discusses the Quill decision and establishes that (1)
the Court's analysis deviates from precedent, (2) the physical presence
test fails when applied to electronic commerce, and (3) such failure re-
sults in discrimination against sellers who have physical presences. Fi-
nally, Part VI discusses alternative methods by which a taxing state may
collect sales and use tax on Net sales from nonresident sellers.
I. INTRODUCTION TO ELECTRONIC COMMERCE
AND THE INTERNET
A. Overview of Electronic Commerce
Electronic commerce has been defined as the process of conducting
5. JAMES C. GONYEA & WAYNE M. GONYEA, SELLING ON THE INTERNET 45-46 (1996).
6. 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
7. Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 317-18. Physical presence requires more than advertising
through common carrier or mail. Id. at 315 (citing National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of
Revenue of Illinois, 386 U.S. 753, 758 (1967)). It may include owning property, operating a
retail outlet, or merely having a sales force present in the state. Id. at 306-307 (citing Felt &
Tarrant Mfg. Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 62 (1939); Nelson v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S.
359 (1941), and Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207 (1960)).
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business over electronic networks as opposed to via traditional methods
such as in person, by mail, or by telephone.8 This definition includes both
business-to-business and business-to-consumer transactions. Electronic
commerce is not new. Companies have been conducting business in this
way since the 1960s, mainly in the form of Electronic Data Interchange
("EDI").9
In its most common form, EDI consists of a value-added network
("VAN"), which links commercial purchasers and suppliers together over
a system of electronic mailboxes." Through these mailboxes, the partieselectronically exchange preapproved business forms, such as purchase
orders, quotations, bills of lading, and invoices." Because of the high cost
of setting up electronic trading agreements on the VAN,12 only large cor-
porations subscribe to the service. 3 EDI remains the primary method by
which corporations exchange purchasing data with their suppliers. 4
B. Electronic Commerce and the Internet
In recent years, electronic commerce has experienced substantial
growth in the form of Net transactions. This is the result of a large num-
ber of new companies engaging in Net commerce. In addition, many EDI
service providers have taken steps to make EDI transactions available
over the Net. 5
8. KOSIUR, supra note 3, at 7-10; Robert D. Hofet al., The "Click Here" Economy, BUS. WK.,
June 22, 1998, at 125.,
9. In addition, banks have used Electronic Fund Transfer since the 1960s to transfer funds
over a dedicated electronic network. KOSIUR, supra note 3 at 1, 267.
10. An EDI service provider will generally manage the VAN. Id. at 56-57.
11. Id. at 266-67.
12. It can cost as much as $50,000 to add an additional supplier to the VAN. Andy Rein-
hardt, Log On, Link Up, Save Big, BUS. WK., June 22, 1998, at 138.
13. In addition to the expense of setting up a VAN, EDI does not allow much flexibility
regarding which business forms may be exchanged. KOSIUR, supra note 3, at 56-57; Reinhardt,
supra note 12, at 134.
14. The value of EDI-based transactions is presently fourteen times greater than that of
business-to-business Net transactions. Those figures, however, are expected to even out in
approximately five years. Reinhardt, supra note 12, at 136.
15. For example, OpenEDI is a series of specifications that standardizes all purchaser EDI
data formats so that such data is simpler to translate and transmit over the Net. KOSIUR, supra
note 3, at 57. In addition, many EDI service providers now offer a service called WebEDI which
converts EDI data into a format that can be transmitted over the Net. Reinhardt, supra note 12,
at 137-38. Some EDI subscribers, such as EcCo., also map EDI data from the purchaser and
convert it to a form that the supplier's personal computer can read. Reinhardt, supra note 12, at
138.
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The Ne °16 consists of a decentralized collection of networks, which
share common rules of communication called transmission ca-
trol/internet protocols ("TCP/IP Protocols")." The Net offers several
ways to transmit information, such as e-mail," File Transfer Protocol
("FTP"), 19 and newsgroups.2 Most commercial information, however,
travels along the World Wide Web ("Web") 21
The Web has had a dramatic affect on both business-to-business and
business-to-consumer transactions. Business-to-business transactions
(which account for eighty percent of the electronic commerce conducted
on the Net)22 concern the sale and purchase of goods and services be-
tween commercial entities; such transactions include advertising, cus-
tomer support, and communication.23 The Web allows businesses to op-
erate more efficiently and cheaply and facilitates the growth of new kinds
of enterprises; for example, Amazon.com (an on-line bookseller without
retail stores or inventory),' Kantara and Software.net (on-line sellers of
commercial software packages),' and FastParts (on-line seller of surplus
16. Several other types of available networks include the following: intranets, which comprise
a company's internal network; extranets, which are two or more intrantets linked together; and
virtual private networks, which occur when an intranet is run through the Net. KOSIUR, supra
note 3, at 32-34.
17. A TCP determines the maximum size of a particular transmission over the network.
KOSIUR, supra note 3, at 276. An IP provides an address for a particular location and controls
the routing of network information. Id. at 269. An electronic address can be compared to a
physical street address and is commonly referred to as a "domain name." Gregory A. Ichel,
Comment, Internet Sounds Death Knell for Use Taxes: States Continue to Scream over Lost Reve-
nues, 27 SETON HALL L. REV. 643, 643 (1997); ESTABROOK, supra note 2, at 12.
18. E-mail, described as "the cornerstone of all communications on the Internet," is an ex-
change of electronic messages and/or data files over the Net. ESTABROOK, supra note 2, at 56.
It is a fast, easy, and inexpensive way for individual subscribers to communicate on a one-to-one
basis. Id. at 55.
19. FTP is a collection of "libraries" established for downloading any type of digital file, in-
cluding text, multimedia, and application files. FTP libraries have limited access and are not
suitable for widespread commercial application. ESTABROOK, supra note 2, at 220-2 1.
20. A newsgroup consists of a system of news servers that "post" related groups of information
to bulletin boards. Subscribers then read these postings. Newsgroups function primarily to
exchange information on related topics and do not welcome commercial activity. ESTABROOK,
supra note 2, at 106-12.
21. The Web embodies a vast network of server and client computers. ESTABROOK, supra
note 2, at 28-29.
22. Peter Coy, You Ain't Seen Nothin' Yet, BUS. WK., June 22, 1998, at 130. Businesses are
expected to exchange $17 billion in goods by the end of the year and a massive $327 billion by
the year 2002. Hofet al., supra note 8, at 124 (citing figures from Forrester Research, Inc.).
23. KOSIUR, supra note 3, at 4.
24. Id. at 5. See also Heather Green & Seanna Browder, Cyberspace Winners: How They Did
It, BUS. WK., June 22, 1998 at 156.
25. Id. at 5-6.
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electronics) .'
Business-to-consumer transactions primarily involve the sale of
goods and services from commercial sellers to consumers. Although such
transactions account for only twenty percent of the business conducted
on-line," the value of such transactions is expected to exceed $5.1 billion
in 1999.2
States generally do not have difficulty in collecting sales or use tax
on business-to-business transactions. Most large commercial entities keep
accurate accounting records. In addition, larger businesses may be subject
to periodic audits by the taxing state.29 Less formal business forms, such
as a general partnership or sole proprietorship, however, may not be sub-
ject to audits and, therefore, exhibit a lower level of compliance.
Consumer purchases pose the greatest problem regarding the collec-
tion of sales and use taxes.3" Consumers rarely keep records of their pur-
chases and many do not realize that they are subject to the tax.31 Ac-
cordingly, this Comment primarily addresses consumer purchases and the
business-to-business transactions of informal commercial entities.
C. Electronic Storefronts
Companies marketing to consumers commonly advertise and sell
their products on-line using a web site. A web site is an electronic address
that accommodates a collection of site documents 2 A web site consists
of a cover or home page and contains related documents 3 Hypertext
links within the site allow visitors to access different pages or even diffe-
ent sites.34
26. Hofet al., supra note 8, at 126.
27. Coy, supra note 22, at 130.
28. Hof et al., supra note 8, at 122 (citing figures from Forrester Research, Inc.). In 1995,
one million five hundred people made on-line purchases. World Wide Web User Statistics (visited
Jan. 19, 1999) <http://www.why-not.com/company/stats.htm> (citing survey performed by
Project 2000, entitled "Internet Use in the United States: 1995 Baseline").
29. Corporations, limited liability companies, limited liability partnerships, and limited part-
nerships all must file forms that are a matter of public record.
30. The United States Supreme Court noted that collecting use tax from consumers presents
"a difficult administrative problem." Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 343 (1954); See
also infra Part IV and Saba Ashraf, Virtual Taxation: State Taxation of Internet and On-Line Sales,
24 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 605, 611 (1997).
31. Saba Ashraf, supra note 30, at 611.
32. ESTABROOK, supra note 2, at 29.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 30. A hypertext link is ordinarily indicated by colored text within the web docu-
ment. Double clicking on the link with a mouse connects the user to other pages or web sites.
1999
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A commercial web site used for the purpose of selling goods and
services over the Net is called an electronic storefront.35 Such storefronts
have the capability to operate like physical retail outlets? 6 They usually
contain an elaborate home page, professional computer-generated
graphics, a banner and subtitle, main and sub-menus, and hypertext
links. 37 In addition, electronic storefronts offer features that allow indi-
viduals visiting them to interact with the storefront. Such features in-
clude provisions for customer service, multimedia capabilities, an on-line
catalogue, downloadable files, and customer questionnaire and credit
card authorization forms.3
The increasing number of electronic storefronts on the Net has cre-
ated a need to organize them. A group of storefronts housed in a single
Net location is referred to as a cybermall.39 Cybermalls offer convenience,
easy access, and one-stop shopping and may one day become as ccrn-
monplace as conventional retail malls.'
Electronic storefronts have already had a tremendous impact on the
marketplace. Consumers now have the ability to bargain hunt for the
most competitive prices, and small businesses have the means to compete
with corporate giants. Doing business over the Net ultimately affects the
way states collect tax revenue from such sales. The following paragraphs
provide an introduction to sales and use tax and the constitutional issues
surrounding each.
II. SALES TAX
A sales tax is a tax on the sale of goods and services' The seller
commonly adds the percentage of the tax to the purchase price and cd-
lects it at the point of sale. Sales tax rates and exemption schedules often
vary from state to state. In addition, some states allow municipalities and
35. See GONYEA, supra note 5, at 39-41.
36. Id. at 41.
37. Id. at 57-66.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 43. CommerceNet, for example, operates a prosperous cybermall. Id. In addition,
Compuserve provides a subscriber membership to a collection of electronic storefronts, including
big names such as J.C. Penney and Sears. Ashraf, supra note 30, at 607. Cybermalls may also be
dedicated to the sale of a particular product, such as AutoMallUSA.com, which houses a group
of automobile dealers.
40. GONYEA, supra note 5, at 42.
41. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 932 (6th ed. 1991). Justice Frankfurter described sales tax as
a tax on the "freedom of purchase." McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327, 330 (1944).
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counties to levy their own sales tax.42 Sales tax revenues provide a signifi-
cant source of income for numerous states.
4 3
The Commerce Clause" prohibits a state from exacting a sales tax
upon goods and services purchased beyond state borders. 5 This limita-
tion significantly impaired the ability of states to collect sales tax as inter-
state commerce expanded in the late 1930s. Consumers could avoid the
tax by simply purchasing goods outside their state of residency. In re-
sponse to this practice, state legislatures enacted the use tax."
III. USE TAX
A use tax is a tax imposed on tangible personal property47 that has
been purchased out of state but brought into the taxing jurisdiction for
use and consumption." A use tax entitles a state to collect a consump-
tion tax on goods that would have been taxed had they been purchased
in state.49 Because of the difficulty of collecting use tax from individual
consumers, the out-of-state seller usually bears the administrative burden
of collecting and remitting the tax.5"
42. For example, Missouri currently has 136 local taxing jurisdictions. AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, SALES & USE TAX DESKBooK 26.16..18 (D. Michael Young et al. eds., 1997-98
ed.).
43. The push for imposition of state sales taxes arose out of the Great Depression. In 1947,
revenue collected from sales tax provided the second largest source of income for 48 states.
PAUL J. HARTMAN, STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE 148 (1953). Sales tax still
remains a vital source of revenue, especially for states that do not impose an income tax. Texas,
for example, derives more than one-half of its annual revenues from sales and use tax. John
Sharp, Virtual Taxation: Electronic Commerce Poses Problems for State Tax Collections, GOVT. FIN.
REV. Aug. 1996 at 36.
44. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 'The Congress shall have the Power To... regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes. .. ." Id.
45. McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327 (1944) (striking down an Arkansas tax on
sales made to Arkansas residents by a Tennessee company because the seller did not maintain a
place of business in Arkansas and all of the sales in question occurred in Tennessee). But see,
Norton v. Illinois, 340 U.S. 534 (1951) (upholding a gross receipts tax regarding sales routed
through an in-state office to an out-of-state office).
46. HARTMAN, supra note 43, at 161-62.
47. See, e.g., Monamotor Oil Co. v. Johnson, 292 U.S. 86 (1934) (upholding a use tax on
gasoline); Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250 (1938) (upholding a gross
receipts tax on advertising space); D.H. Holmes Co., Ltd. v. McNamara, 486 U.S. 24 (1988)
(upholding a use tax on catalogues distributed within the state). Today, use statutes often in-
clude services as well. See, e.g., TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 151.005(3) and 151.0101(a) (West
1998).
48. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1073 (6th ed. 1991).
49. HARTMAN, supra note 43, at 162.
50. See supra note 30. Early constitutional challenges to this practice met with little success.
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A use tax advances two fundamental policies. First, it preserves state
sales tax revenues by discouraging tax avoidance Application of the tax
eliminates any savings for consumers who purchase goods out of state.
Second, it protects local sellers from losing business to out-of-state mer-
chants.52
The United States Supreme Court has consistently sustained the
constitutionality of the use tax. As early as 1937,5" the Court upheld a
Washington state use tax challenged as violative of the Commerce
Clause. 4 Justice Cardozo reasoned that the Washington law55 did not
levy the tax against the interstate sale, but rather taxed the "privilege of
use after commerce [was] at an end."'5 The Court refined this holding in
Western Livestock v. Bureau of Revenue. 7 Western Livestock concerned the
collection of a gross receipts tax"8 levied against the sale of advertising
See, e.g., Monamotor Oil Company, 292 U.S. at 93 (requiring the seller to collect use tax is a
"common and entirely lawful arrangement"); Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577
(1937); Felt & Tarrant Mfg. Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 62 (1939); General Trading v. Tax
Comm'n of Iowa, 322 U.S. 335, 338-39 (1944) (making a seller a tax collector for the state is a
"familiar and sanctioned device"). Some statutes will compensate sellers for this service. See,
e.g., Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207, 210 (1960); Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S.
340, 358, n 1 (1954); Quill Corp. v. Heitkamp, 470 N.W.2d 203, 215 (N.D. 1991).
51. "It is one of the well-known functions of the integrated use and sales tax to remove the
buyers' temptation 'to place their orders in other states in the effort to escape payment of the tax
on local sales."' Nelson v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359, 363 (1941)(citing Henneford v.
Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577, 581 (1937).
52. Hartman explains that "[tihe unfortunate result of such bargain hunting abroad is not
merely a short.changing of the state's coffers, but local merchants whose transactions are subject
to the local sales tax find themselves at a competitive disadvantage with an extra-state seller
whose sales are subject to no sales tax." HARTMAN, supra note 43, at 161.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized the need to protect local merchants
from out-of-state competition. See, e.g., Miller Bros. v. Maryland, 347, U.S. 340, 343 (1954);
National Geographic Soc'y v. California Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551 (1977).
53. Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577 (1937).
54. Henneford, 300 U.S. at 588.
55. Id. at 580. To avoid double taxation, the Washington statute provided for a credit if the
purchaser had already paid Washington sales tax. Id. The statute also offered a credit for taxes
paid to other states. Id. The Court noted in dicta that this allowance was merely permissive,
not mandatory. Id. at 587.
56. Id. at 582. Henneford concerned a Washington State use tax levied against construction
machinery brought into the state from an out-of-state contractor. Id. at 579. The statute was
challenged on the basis that the state could not tax an interstate sale under the Commerce
Clause. Id. at 581. See also, General Trading v. State Tax Comm'n of Iowa, 322 U.S., 335
(1944) (holding that use tax does not violate the Commerce Clause).
57. 303 U.S. 250 (1938).
58. A gross receipts tax is a levy against a company's pre-tax earnings. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 485 (6th ed. 1991). The taxing state collects a percentage of the total gross in-
come generated from business transacted within the state. A tax against gross receipts functions
much like a sales tax in that the amount of the tax depends upon the volume of in-state sales.
The New Mexico statute challenged in Western Livestock promulgated a tax
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space in an interstate trade magazine 9 The Court upheld the tax on the
basis that it did not subject interstate commerce to additional local exac-
tions. ° The Court asserted that "it was not the purpose of the Commerce
Clause to relieve those engaged in interstate commerce from their just
share of state tax burden even though it increases the cost of doing the
business." ' Together Henneford and Western Livestock stand for the
proposition that states possess the power to enact use taxes as long as the
tax on the interstate sale does not exceed the amount paid by local
commerce.
This concept was recently endorsed by the Court in Associated In-
dustries of Missouri v. Lohman.62 Lohman addressed the issue of whether a
compensating use tax63 may be greater than its corresponding sales tax."
The Court determined that it could not.65 The Commerce Clause and
Due Process Clause" prohibit state governments from taxing interstate
sales at a higher rate than local sales.67
Once the Court had established a constitutional basis for the enact-
ment of state use tax statutes, retailers challenged the application of the
tax under the Due Process Clause. These early cases examined under
what circumstances a state may reach beyond its borders to compel an
measured by the amount or volume of business done against the persons, on ac-
count of their business activities, engaging, or continuing, within the State of
New Mexico, ...at an amount equal to 2 per cent of the gross receipts of any
person engaging or continuing in ... [the] [plublication of newspapers and
magazines (but the gross receipts ... shall include only the amounts received for
the sale of advertising space).
Western Livestock, 303 U.S. 250 at 251 (citing 1934 N.M. Laws Spec. Sess., ch. 7, § 201, subd. I.)
59. Western Livestock, 303 U.S. 250 at 252-53.
60. Id. at 259-61. The Court rejected the rule that the tax of interstate gross receipts was
unconstitutional per se. Instead, the Court acknowledged that interstate commerce may be
required to "pay its way." Such "price," however, may not exceed the burdens placed on local
commerce. Id. at 258. Thus, the Commerce Clause protects interstate commerce from sustain-
ing "the cumulative burdens not imposed upon local commerce." Id. at 256.
61. Id. at 254.
62. 511 U.S. 641 (1994).
63. The "compensatory tax" doctrine authorizes a state to burden interstate commerce
through a use tax as long as the state imposes an equal burden on intrastate commerce through
a sales tax. Lohman, 511 U.S. at 645. The use tax challenged in Lohman did not necessarily
correspond to a local sales tax. Id.
64. Id. at 644-45. The Court found that the Missouri tax violated the negative Commerce
Clause powers by discriminating against out-of-state sellers. Id. at 654.
65. Id. at 648-52.
66. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law." Id.
67. Lohman, 511 U.S. at 649-52. The Court rejected the state's argument that its taxing
scheme had a negligible impact on interstate commerce. Id. at 652. The state claimed that the
tax was valid because most out-of-state purchases were made by persons domiciled in jurisdic-
tions that had a local sales tax equal or greater than the compensating use tax. Id. at 645.
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out-of-state vendor to collect and remit the tax.
IV. LAW GOVERNING COLLECTION OF STATE USE TAx
FROM OUT-OF-STATE SELLERS
A. Early Cases
Due process requires the presence of minimum contacts68 before a
state may exercise personal jurisdiction69 over a nonresident party.
70
Thus, for a state to extend its taxing power to sales made by an out-of-
state seller, the seller must have established minimum contacts with the
taxing state. Traditionally, this has been a relatively easy standard to sat-
isfy." In Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney, Co.,72 the Court found sufficient con-
tacts when "the taxing power exerted by the state [bore] a fiscal relation
to protection, opportunities and benefits given by the state.'' J.C. Penney
concerned a corporate levy for the privilege of declaring and receiving
dividends.7 4 J.C. Penney, Co. ("J.C. Penney") received income from bus-
ness conducted in Wisconsin but maintained its headquarters in New
York.75 Applying a functional analysis,76 the Court held that the declara-
68. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). International Shoe intro-
duced the concept that a state may obtain personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant
only if (1) such defendant had minimum contacts with the forum state and (2) going forward
with the action did not offend "traditional conception of fair play and substantial justice." Inter-
national Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 320-21.
69. For the purposes of this comment, "personal jurisdiction" refers to specific judicial juris-
diction. Specific judicial jurisdiction is a form of in personam jurisdiction, which focuses on
deliberate contacts between a nonresident defendant and the forum state. For a valid exercise
of jurisdiction, the cause of action asserted must arise from the contacts. Darren L. McCarty,
Note, Internet Contacts and Forum Notice: A Formula for Personal Jurisdiction, 39 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 557, 565-68 (1998).
70. A full discussion of personal jurisdiction is beyond the scope of this comment. For a
comprehensive analysis of personal jurisdiction and the Net, see McCarty, supra note 69.
71. See, e.g., McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) (mailing of a consent form to a
nonresident customer constitutes minimum contacts).
72. 311 U.S. 435 (1940).
73. J.C. Penney, Co., 311 U.S. at 444. "The simple but controlling issue is whether the state
has given anything for which it can ask return." Id. Note that this statement by the Court
represents the fourth prong of the Complete Auto test, infra note 138.
74. J.C. Penney, Co., 311 U.S. at 441-42. The Wisconsin Privilege Dividend Tax provides, in
pertinent part, that "[fQor the privilege of declaring and receiving dividends, out of income
derived from property located and business transacted in this state, there is hereby imposed a tax
equal to two and one-half percentum of the amount of such dividends declared...." 1935 Wis.
LAWS 505 (as amended by 1935 WiS. LAWS 552).
75. J.C. Penney, Co., 311 U.S. at 443.
1999 Physical Presence in Cyberspace
tion of dividends in New York did not dissolve the nexus between the
Wisconsin sales and the tax on income derived from those sales.
One year later, the Court addressed a similar due process issue in-
volving the Iowa Use Tax Act." Sears Roebuck & Co. ("Sears"), a New
York corporation, had a permit to do business in Iowa and operated retail
stores there.7" The state of Iowa sought to impose a use tax not only on
retail sales, but also on mail order sales made to Iowa customers!' Sears
alleged that the mail order sales were completely unrelated to its retail
business and should be exempt from the tax.' The Court disagreed and
upheld the tax on the basis that the retail sales carried the same tax bur-
den as did the mail order sales.82 Because Sears possessed a permit to do
business in Iowa (and maintained retail outlets there), the company te-
ceived "benefits from Iowa for which [Iowa] has the power to exact a
price."" Both J.C. Penney and Sears Roebuck established a nexus based
upon the opportunity to conduct in-state business. Sears Roebuck added
the notion that once contacts occur, any local sales are subject to the
taxing power of the state.
8 5
The Court later expanded the ways in which its requirements for
contacts may be satisfied to include the presence of traveling salesmen 6
and independent contractors.7 General Trading Co. v. State Tax Commis-
76. A state cannot tax the privilege of doing business. See Western Livestock v. Bureau of
Revenue, 303 U.S. 250 (1938). Choosing not to invalidate the Wisconsin Privilege Dividend
Act based on its name, the Court construed the statute to enact an income tax rather than a tax
on the privilege of doing business. j.C. Penney, Co., 311 U.S. at 442.
77. J.C. Penney, Co., 311 U.S. at 445. The Court permitted the tax because it was based
upon sales made to Wisconsin residents. Id. at 446.
78. Nelson v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359 (1941). The Iowa Use Tax Act imposed a
"two per cent tax on gross receipts from sales of tangible personal property sold at retail in the
state to consumers or users." IOWA CODE § 6943.103 (1939).
79. Sears Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. at 362. Sears Roebuck & Co. operated twelve retail stores
in Iowa. Id. at n.3. In addition, it mailed 600,000 small and 427,000 large catalogues to Iowa
residents in 1937. Id.
80. Id. at 362.
81. Id. at 362.64.
82. Id. at 364-66. In fact, the Court viewed Sears Roebuck & Co.'s argument as purporting
"to found a constitutional right on the practical opportunities for tax avoidance which its
method of doing business affords Iowa residents... ." Id. at 366.
83. Id. at 365. The "benefits" received from Iowa include the privilege to do business there
and any incidents or advantages following therefrom. Id. at 364
84. In Sears Roebuck & Co., this also included the existence of retail stores. See supra note 78.
85. The Court quickly affirmed the Sears Roebuck & Co. decision in Nelson v. Montgomery
Ward &Co., 312 U.S. 373 (1941).
86. See General Trading Co. v. State Tax Comm'n of Iowa, 322 U.S. 335 (1944).
87. See Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207 (1960).
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sion of Iowa also concerned the Iowa Use Tax Act.!' General Trading ad-
dressed the issue of whether Iowa may enforce the tax against a Minne-
sota corporation that did not maintain a place of business in Iowa.!9 Un-
like Sears, General Trading Co. ("General") was not licensed to do busi-
ness and did not own property located in the state. The company did,
however, solicit orders through traveling salesmen stationed theref0 The
Court found that the presence of the salesmen constituted sufficient
contacts to enable Iowa to enforce the tax.91
In Scripto, Inc. v. Carson,92 the Court explored whether the state of
Florida could require a Georgia corporation to collect and remit use tax
for the sale of "mechanical writing instruments 9 3 to Florida residents.94
Scripto, Inc. ("Scripto") did not own property or employ salesmen in
Florida.9' Instead, it solicited orders through jobbers who were independ-
ent contractors.' The Court again found a sufficient nexus between the
state and the sale of goods to Florida customers9 As in Sears Roebuck,
the Court declined to excuse state tax liability on the basis of a can-
pany's method of doing business9
The cases discussed above demonstrate how easily a taxing state can
establish minimum contacts. The Court has, however, set limits. A state
cannot impose the collection of use taxes upon a seller who neither en-
ters nor reaches out toward the taxing jurisdiction. In Miller Brothers Co.
88. General Trading Co., 322 U.S. at 336-37. Iowa sought to require General Trading Co. to
collect and remit the tax because of it was a "'retailer maintaining a place of business' in Iowa."
Id. at 336.
89. Id. at 336, 337.
90. Id. at 337.
91. Id. at 338-39. The Court asserted that requiring the presence of retail stores "is constitu-
tionally irrelevant to the right of Iowa. . . to exact a use tax . .. ." Id. at 338. The focus should
remain on the sale of personal property to the Iowa resident "who is paying taxes to sustain his
own state government." Id.
92. 362 U.S. 207 (1960).
93. Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. at 208.
94. Id. at 207. The Florida statute imposed a "tax at the rate of three percent of the retail
sales price ... collectible from all dealers as herein defined on the sale at retail .... of tangible
personal property." FLA. STAT. ch. 212.06(1) (1958). "Dealer," as defined under the statute,
"means and includes every person who solicits business either by representatives or by the distri-
bution of catalogs or other advertising matter and by reason thereof receives and accepts orders
from consumers in the state ...."
FLA. STAT. ch. 212.06(2) (1958).
95. Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. at 208-09.
96. Id. at 209.
97. Id. at211.
98. Id. at 212. '"True, the 'salesmen' are not regular employees of appellant devoting full time
to its service, but we conclude that such a fine distinction is without constitutional significance."
Id. at 211. See supra note 82.
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v. Maryland," the Court refused to uphold a Maryland use tax"°° levied
against a Delaware corporation.' Miller Brothers Co. ("Miller") oper-
ated a small retail store in Delaware and solicited orders only in person' 2
Maryland residents had to actually travel to Delaware to purchase the
goods.' The Court espoused that "due process requires some definite
link, some minimum connection, between a state and the person, prcp-
erty or transaction it seeks to tax."'" Given that Miller had virtually no
connection with the state of Maryland, the Court determined that there
was not a sufficient nexus for Maryland to enforce the tax.103
The early case law indicates that, in most instances, a merchant who
conducted business within a state formed sufficient contacts to trigger
the application of a use tax. With the growth of mail order sales, how-
ever, out-of-state merchants performed a great volume of business while
maintaining contacts only through common carrier or the U.S. mail. The
following line of United States Supreme Court decisions, beginning with
the 1967 decision of National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of
Illinois,'° specifically address the due process issues raised in connection
with mail order sales.
B. Later Cases Involving Mail Order Catalogue Sellers
Confronted with a fast-growing mail order industry, the Court de-
parted from precedent when it decided National BleUas Hess. National
Bellas Hess, Inc. ("National") was a nationwide mail order house0 7 in-
99. 347 U.S. 340 (1954).
100. The statute levied an excise tax "imposed on the use, storage or consumption in this
State of tangible personal property purchased from a vendor within or without this State." MD.
ANN. CODE art. 81, § 369 (1951). It further provided that "[elvery vendor engaging in business
in this State ... shall collect the tax." MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 371 (1951). "Engaging in
business" is defined as the "selling or delivering in this State ... tangible personal property...
[through] a subsidiary agent .. .salesman, canvasser or solicitor operating in this State." MD.
ANN. CODE art 81 § 368 (1951).
101. Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 341-42. Maryland premised its argument on
the fact that Miller (1) placed newspaper and radio advertisements, (2) circulated flyers, (3)
delivered merchandise to Maryland residents via common carrier, and (4) delivered merchandise
to Maryland residents via its own delivery truck. Id.
102. Id. at 341. In addition, Miller did not actively solicit business in Maryland. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 344-45.
105. Id. at 346-47.
106. 386 U.S. 753 (1967).
107. National was a clothing retailer that sold approximately 4,000 items through its cata-
logue. National Bellas Hess, Inc., 386 U.S. at 760-61 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
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corporated in Delaware with its principal place of business in Missouri.08
Because of National's large volume of sales to Illinois residents, 09 Illinois
attempted to compel National to collect and pay use tax."' National
neither had a place of business nor employed representatives in Illinois."
Its only connection with the state was through catalogue mailings to Ilk-
nois customers." 2
For the first time, the Court considered whether this type of solicita-
tion"3 entitled a state to compel a nonlocal seller to collect and remit use
tax." 4 The Court drew a clear distinction between businesses that have
property or resources within a state and those that "do no more than
communicate with customers in the state by mail or common carrier as
part of a general interstate business.""' The Court refused to enforce the
tax against a seller whose sole contact with the taxing state was by mail
or common carrier." 6 To do otherwise would severely impair the ability
of sellers such as National to conduct business." 7 In addition, the Court
feared the negative cumulative effect of local taxes on interstate ccn-
merce."' Because National did not have any "retail outlets, solicitors or
property within [the] State[,] '' "9 the Court struck down the tax.'
108. Id. at 753-54. National was licensed to do business in Delaware and Missouri. Id. at 754.
109. Illinois assessed taxes against $2,174,744 of in-state sales over a 15-month period. Id. at
761 (Fortas, J., dissenting). National's net sales for 1961 were approximately $60,000,000. Id. at
760-61 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
110. Any "retailer maintaining a place of business in this State" must collect and remit use tax
to the Department of Revenue. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120 § 439.3 (1965). The act encompasses
any retailer "[e]ngaging in soliciting orders within this State from users by means of catalogues or
other advertising, whether such orders are received or accepted within or without this State."
ILL REV. STAT. ch. 120 § 439.2 (1965).
111. National Bellas Hess, Inc., 386 U.S. at 754.
112. Id. at 754-55. National sent out catalogues semiannually to a customer base of more
than 5,000,000. Id. at 754, 761 (Fortas, J., dissenting). This figure does not include bulk mail-
ings of "flyers." Id. at 761 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
113. "Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of commercial transactions more exclusively interstate
in character than the mail order transactions here involved." Id. at 759.
114. Id. at 756-58.
115. Id. at 758. This language has been interpreted as "creat[ing] a safe harbor for vendors."
Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 315 (1992).
116. National Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 758. "[T]he Court has never held that a State may
impose the duty of use tax collection and payment upon a seller whose only contact with cus-
tomers in the State is by common carrier or the United States mail." Id.
117. Id. at 759. "[I]f the power of Illinois to impose use tax burdens upon National were up-
held, the resulting impediments upon the free conduct of its interstate business would be neither
imaginary nor remote." Id.
118. Id. at 759-60. The Court noted that, as of 1965, there were more than 2,300 local taxing
jurisdictions and at least eight taxing rates. Id. at 760.
119. Id. at 758.
120. Id. at 760.
274
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Approximately ten years later, the Court addressed a similar issue in
National Geographic Society v. California Board of Equalization. 12' National
Geographic Society concerned the state of California's effort to enforce its
use tax against the mail order sales of the National Geographic Society
("National Geographic").' 22 National Geographic was a nonprofit organi
zation headquartered in the District of Columbia, where it conducted a
mail order enterprise.'23 It also maintained two branch offices in Califor-
nia, which performed services unrelated to its mail-order sales." Relying
on Sears Roebuck" and its progeny, the Court held that the presence of
the offices provided a sufficient nexus for California to impose the tax!'
This decision marked a return to the due process analyss' that the
Court had abandoned in National Bellas Hess.'"s
Shortly after handing down National Geographic Society, the Court
announced a four-part test combining due process and commerce clause
analyses. This test was applied to determine the constitutional validity of
the Mississippi privilege tax. 29 In Complete Auto Transit, the state of Mis-
sissippi sought to compel Complete Auto Transit, Inc. ("Complete
Auto") to remit a five percent tax for the privilege of doing business
within the state. 3 Complete Auto was a Michigan company that trans-
ported automobiles for General Motors Corporation.'3' It alleged that the
121. 430 U.S. 551 (1977).
122. National Geographic Soc'y, 430 U.S. at 552-54. California sought to collect use tax on
$83,596.48 of mail order goods purchased by California residents. Residents ordered the goods
from National Geographic Magazine and the company then shipped the items from the District of
Columbia and Maryland. Id. at 554.
123. Id. at 552. Customers could order items such as books and maps. Id.
124. Id. The California offices organized National Geographic's monthly magazine, the Na-
tional Geographic Magazine. Id.
125. Nelson v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359 (1941); See supra Part IV(A).
126. The fact that National Geographic carried on some sort of business was enough. This was
true even though the operations of the branch offices remained separate from those of the maga-
zine. See supra note 82.
127. 'The question presented by this case is whether [National Geographic's] activities at the
offices in California provided sufficient nexus between the out-of-state seller appellant and the
State--as required by the Due Process Clause." National Geographic Soc'y, 430 U.S. at 554.
128. National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. 753 (1967).
129. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
130. Complete Auto Transit, Inc., 430 U.S. at 274-76. The statute enacted a tax "for the privi-
lege of engaging or continuing in business or doing business within this state to be determined by
the application of rates against gross proceeds of sales or gross income ... equal to five per cent."
MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 10105, 10109 (1972).
131. Complete Auto Transit, Inc., 430 U.S. at 276. The vehicles in question were shipped by
rail from General Motors plants to Jackson, Mississippi. Complete Auto then transported the
vehicles by truck from Jackson to dealers throughout the state. Because the vehicles were origi-
nally shipped from outside of Mississippi, the Mississippi courts presumed that Complete Auto
performed services as part of an interstate transaction and the United States Supreme Court
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Mississippi statute taxed the "privilege" of doing business within the
state.
132
The Court focused on the effect of the tax adopting a practical
rather than formalistic approach.133 The Court devised the following
four-part test.134 The test requires that (1) the seller's activity have a sub-
stantial nexus with the taxing state,135 (2) the tax be fairly apportioned, 36
(3) the tax be nondiscriminatory,'37 and (4) the tax be related to services
provided by the taxing state to the seller.13 The Court determined that,
as applied to Complete Auto, the Mississippi tax satisfied all four ele-
ments and upheld the statute.
139
C. Quill Coip. v. North Dakota
The Court's decision in Quil Corp. v. North Dakota"4 reaffirmed the
agreed. Id.
132. Id. at 278. When Complete Auto was decided, a tax upon the privilege of doing business
within a state was considered unconstitutional per se. Id. See Spector Motor Service v. O'Con-
nor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951) and Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249 (1946).
133. The Court discarded the semantic distinction between direct and indirect burdens on
commerce and overruled Spector Motor Service and Freeman. Complete Auto Transit, Inc., 430
U.S. at 280-81, 283-86, 288.
134. Complete Auto Transit, Inc., 430 U.S. at 279.
135. The first prong of the test sets forth a due process requirement for a constitutional nexus.
A similar requirement is found in Standard Pressed Steel Co. v. Washington Dep't of Revenue,
419 U.S. 560 (1975) (a sole employee in the state of Washington functioned as a liaison be-
tween Standard Pressed Steel Co. and its primary customer, Boeing Company; because the em-
ployee performed activities vital to Standard's business in Washington, the Court found a suffi-
cient nexus).
136. The second prong of the test mandates that the tax apply only to funds generated within
the taxing state and prohibits discrimination against interstate commerce. This concept can be
traced to Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U.S. 80 (1948) (a tax is fairly apportioned
when it only includes capital invested within the state).
137. The third prong of the test prohibits discrimination against interstate commerce.
138. The fourth prong of the test specifies contacts required under the Due Process Clause.
This idea is also encountered in Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney, Co., 311 U.S. 435 (1940) (explaining
that rights associated with the privilege to do business in the state constitute a service provided
by the state and are related to corporate revenues). See also Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone,
335 U.S. 80 (1948) (holding that "local incidents" of manning, maintaining and keeping local
pipeline in repair constitute services from the state which are related to income generated by the
pipeline).
139. Complete Auto Transit, Inc., 430 U.S. at 289.
140. 504 U.S. 298 (1992). The Court granted certiorari after the Supreme Court of North
Dakota upheld the tax. Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 301-02. See Heitkamp v. Quill Corp., 470
N.W.2d 203 (N.D. 1991). Arguing that National Bellas Hess should be overruled, the court in
Heitkamp explained that "[t]he economic, social, and commercial landscape upon which Bellas
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physical presence test set forth in National Bellas Hess.141 Quill addressed
whether the state of North Dakota could require an out-of-state mail
order catalogue seller to collect and remit use tax'42 for sales made to
North Dakota customers. 43 Quill Corporation ("Quill") was a Delaware
corporation with offices in Illinois, California, and Georgia.'" Quill did
not have an office, property, or employees in North Dakota but grossed
more than $1,000,000 in mail order catalogue sales to North Dakota
residents. 45 The issue before the Court was whether North Dakota could
obligate Quill to collect and remit use tax for its North Dakota sales.'
To decide this question, the Court performed a two-part analysis.
First, it clearly differentiated between constitutional nexus under a due
process analysis and constitutional nexus under a commerce clause
analysis. 47 The Due Process Clause concerns issues of "fundamental fair-
ness," 1' whereas the Commerce Clause concerns the "structure and e-
fect of state regulation on the national economy."'49 Due process juris-
prudence has established a minimum contacts requirement. Commerce
Clause jurisprudence, however, as set forth in Complete Auto requires a
"substantial nexus."'50 Because the substantial nexus requirement serves
Hess was premised no longer exists . . 'mail order' has grown from a relatively inconsequential
market niche into a Goliath now more accurately delineated as 'direct marketing."' Heitkamp,
470 N.W.2d at 208. Applying the four-part test of Complete Auto, the court determined that
Quill had substantial presence in the state. Id. at 216. "Quill has availed itself of modem tech-
nology to engage in an extensive, continuous, and intentional solicitation and exploitation of
the State's consumer market and has thereby established an ubiquitous presence in the State."
Id.
141. National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. 753 (1967).
142. Heitkamp, 470 N.W.2d 203, 204.05. North Dakota exacts a tax upon goods "purchased
for storage, use, or consumption within the State." N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-40.2-01 (1991).
The statute further provides that any "retailer maintaining a place of business in" the state must
collect and pay the tax. N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-40.2-07 (1991). The term "retailer" includes
"every person who engages in regular or systematic solicitation of a consumer market in this
state." N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-40.2-01(6). The phrase "regular solicitation" means "three or
more separate transmittances of any advertisement or advertisements" within a twelve-month
period. N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 81-04.1-01-03.1(3) (1991).
143. Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 302-03.
144. Id. at 302.
145. Quill was the sixth largest vendor of office supplies in the state. Heitkamp, 470 N.W.2d
at 216. It annually shipped 230,000 flyers and catalogues to its 3,500 North Dakota customers.
Id.
146. Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 303.
147. Id. at 312-13. "Despite the similarity in phrasing, the nexus requirements of the Due
Process and Commerce Clauses are not identical. The two standards are animated by different
constitutional concerns and policies." Id. at 312.
148. Id. at 312.
149. Id.
150. Id. at311.
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as a "means for limiting state burdens on interstate commerce," it de-
mands more of a relationship than a minimum contacts.15' The Court
therefore concluded that "a corporation may have the 'minimum cn-
tacts' with a taxing State as required by the Due Process Clause, and yet
lack the 'substantial nexus' with that state required by the Commerce
Clause.'
5 2
Second, the Court defined "substantial nexus." When applying
Complete Auto's four-part test, the Court incorporated physical presence
as an element under the first and fourth parts of the test. 53 Thus, to sat-
isfy the substantial nexus requirement, a partq must have physical pres-
ence; that is, own property, maintain a retail store, or station employees
within the taxing state. 54 Because Quill did not have physical presence
in North Dakota, the Court exempted it from paying the tax.
Further supporting its argument, the Court strongly emphasized the
need for a bright-line test in this area. Such a rule "firmly establishes the
boundaries of legitimate state authority to impose a duty to collect sales
and use taxes and reduces litigation concerning those taxes."'55 In addi-
tion, the Court maintained that Complete Auto did not overrule National
Bellas Hess and that the concept of physical presence remained good law.
156 Finally, the Court justified its reliance on National Bellas Hess based
upon the "doctrine and principles of stare decisis."'57
Justice Scalia based his concurrence largely upon the doctrine of
stare decisis. 58 In addition, he recognized that businesses had long relied
on the physical presence test and advised against "visit[ing] economic
hardship upon those who took us at our word."'59
Justice White, in dissent, argued that the majority had no basis for
claiming that the Commerce Clause requires a more stringent standard
151. Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 313.
152. Id.
153. Id. at313-15.
154. Id. at 315.
155. Id. at 315. The Court also highlighted the fact that the "Bellas Hess Rule has engendered
substantial reliance and has become part of the basic framework of a sizable industry." Id. at
317.
156. Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at314. The Court asserted that decisions regarding sellers who had
a physical presence within the taxing state "do not directly conflict with the rule of Bellas Hess
or compel that it be overruled." Id.
157. Id. at 317.
158. Id. at 320 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia stated that, "[uinlike the Court, how-
ever, I would not revisit the merits of [National Bellas Hess], but would adhere to it on the basis
of stare decisis." Id.
159. Id. at 321 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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for finding a nexus than does the Due Process Clause."6 He noted that
even the majority could not find "authority for this novel interpretation
of our cases."' 6 The holding in Complete Auto, as were the cases upon
which it relied, was based on a due process nexus analysis.
62
The dissent also questioned why the majority sustained the ruling in
National Bellas Hess and did not give it "the complete burial it justly de-
serves."163 Even assuming that the Court's interpretation of prior case law
had merit, National Bellas Hess no longer applies to modem society. The
dissent contended that "in today's economy, physical presence frequently
has very little to do with a transaction a State might seek to tax.'
V. ANALYSIS OF THE QuIL DEcIsIoN
A. Quill Searches for Black Letter Law
Justice White's dissent validly criticizes the majority opinion. Despite
the complex reasoning the majority offers for sustaining the physical
presence test, earlier case law simply does not support such an analysis.
65
With the exception of National Bellas Hess, previous decisions have con-
sistently employed a minimum contacts due process argument. None of
the previous decisions, not even National Bellas Hess, even hinted at the
distinction that the Court went to painstaking efforts to establish. In this
regard, Justice White's dissent is on point.
The Court, however, expressed valid reasons for adopting a bright-
line test in this area. A steadfast rule is needed to offer guidance to lower
courts and provide security to the commercial sector. Unfortunately, the
Court's decision has adversely affected the taxing authority of local juri-
dictions.' 66
160. Id. at 325 (White, J., dissenting).
161. Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 325 (White, J., dissenting).
162. Id. at 326-28 (White, J., dissenting).
163. Id. at 322 (White, J., dissenting).
164. Id. at 327-28 (White, J., dissenting).
165. See, e.g., Nelson v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359 (1941); General Trading Co. v.
Tax Comm'n of Iowa, 322 U.S. 335 (1944); Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340
(1954);and Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207 (1960).
166. Saba Ashraf, supra note 30, at 609.
Nine out of ten executives of American companies engaged in buying and selling
over the Internet called for clarification in the governing regulations. An over-
whelming fifty-one percent of the 291 executives surveyed (of companies with
gross revenues in excess of $50 million) stated that the lack of clarity in state
and local tax laws governing electronic commerce was inhibiting their involve-
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B. The Issue: Physical Presence v. Economic Presence
The big question Quill attempts to answer is, when does a state have
the ability to extend its taxing power to a non-resident seller? Under tra-
ditional due process theory, a state's power to tax would attach when the
seller establishes minimum contacts. 67 Under National Bellas Hess, it
would attach only when the seller is physically present.
168
Both the dissent in Quill and the majority in the underlying North
Dakota Supreme Court decision, Heitkamp v. Quill Corp., argued for a
due process standard that incorporates the concept of "economic pres-
ence."' 69 Economic presence refers to a seller's performance of "extensive,
continuous and intentional solicitation.' 7 Examples of contacts indi-
cating economic presence include market base, gross sales, and volume of
sales. This standard seems to demand more than minimum contacts but
less than physical presence.
Physical presence, however, as enunciated in National Bellas Hess is
simply that: physical presence within state borders. The court in Heit-
kamp asserted that "technological advances have made physical presence
within the jurisdiction meaningless in modem commerce.' '7 Although a
seller may lack physical presence, it can still take advantage of its eco-
nomic presence and remain exempt from state use or sales tax obliga-
tions.' If out-of-state sellers can conduct business within a state and not
be required to collect use tax, then states and local merchants face the
ment with Internet business applications. An alarming twenty percent admitted
that they did not know whether their companies were even subject to the sales
and transaction taxes on the sale of products and services over the Internet.
Id. at 610 (footnotes omitted).
167. See supra note 68 and Part IV.
168. National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue of 1i., 386 U.S. 753, 758 (1967).
169. Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 327-28; Heitkamp v. Quill Corp., 470 N.W.2d 203, 208-09
(1991). An economic presence analysis appears in Standard Pressed Steel Co. v. Washington, 419
U.S. 560 (1975) (upholding gross receipts tax when the activities of a single employee service
the largest customer in the state) and Tyler Pipe Industries v. National, 483 U.S. 232, 250 (1987)
("[Tihe crucial factor governing nexus is whether the activities performed in this state on behalf
of the taxpayer are significantly associated with the taxpayer's ability to establish and maintain a
market in this state."). In addition, the term "economic presence" was actually used by the
Court in D.H. Holmes Co., Ltd. v. McNamara, to describe the contacts of a clothing retailer with
the State of Louisiana. D.H. Holmes Co., Ltd. v. McNamara, 486 U.S. 24, 33. (1988).
170. Heitkamp v. Quill Corp., 470 N.W.2d 203, 216 (N.D. 1991).
171. See Heitkamp, 470 N.W.2d at 216; McNamara, 486 U.S. 24 at 32-33.
172. Heitkamp, 470 N.W.2d at 212.
173. Id. at 215. "It would be odd indeed if we were to hold that out-of-state sellers may invoke
the Due Process Clause to promote a fundamentally unfair economic advantage over local sell-
ers." Id.
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same dilemma they did before the enactment of use tax statutes 74 It is
especially important to keep this disparity in mind when discussing physi-
cal presence within the context of electronic commerce.
VI. APPLICATION OF QUILL TO INTERNET COMMERCE
A. The Problem with Physical Presence
The court in Heitkamp describes the mail order industry as "essen-
tially offering a 'department store by mail."'"75 In many ways, commerce
over the Net resembles mail order sales. 76 In fact, several companies that
previously conducted mail order businesses have recently converted their
sales operations to deal exclusively through the Net.'77 There are, how-
ever, significant differences between mail order sales and sales over the
Net.
Use of the Net greatly reduces the need for physical presence outside
the state in which the seller maintains its principal place of business.
Doing business over the Net diminishes the necessity for distribution
centers, customer service centers, and on-site employees. For example,
Amazon.com is a bookseller that has no inventory or retail stores.' In
addition, Kaplan Education Centers has just recently launched a law
school, Concord University School of Law, which will operate completely
on-line without a campus, library, or professors. 9
A web site reaches a potentially unlimited national and international
market. Unlike catalogue and telephone solicitations, web sites are not
necessarily targeted to a specific geographic location. The creator of the
site makes it available on the Net so that potential customers will "visit"
the site. A potential buyer "visits" a Web site much like he or she would
visit a store.
These differences clearly give companies who sell products over the
Net an advantage over those who engage in mail order sales. In addition
174. See supra Parts II and III.
175. Heitkamp, 470 N.W.2d at 209.
176. Ashraf, supra note 30, at 628.
177. For example, Gateway Computers moved from selling computers by telephone to selling
via the Net; Nets Inc. converted its printed catalogue to an on-line catalogue. KOSIUR, supra
note 3, at 117-31, 133-49.
178. Id. at 5.




to commercial benefits, Net vendors also have an advantage regarding
state use tax. Net transactions do not have geographical boundaries. Use
of the net for commercial sales also facilitates the creation of "virtual"
companies, which do not maintain a place of business. Because of this,
such companies do not satisfy the physical presence test mandated by
Quill. As a result, companies that conduct business over the Net will
likely be exempt from collecting and paying state use tax.
B. Application of the Quill Test Is Discriminatory
The application of Quill's physical presence test in the context of
selling over the Net discriminates against traditional and mail-order sell-
ers. Both out-of-state sellers with physical presence and Net sellers share
in the economic benefit of selling goods and/or services to residents
within the state. However, Net sellers do not bear the burden of collect-
ing and remitting use tax, while out-of-state sellers with physical presence
do.
Relieving a company of its use tax burden offers significant benefits.
In addition to enabling a seller to offer items at a "discounted" price, it
saves the seller the administrative cost of collecting the tax. It also gives
the seller repose in that it will not be liable for any deficiency judgments
or penalties. There currently exist more than 6,000 local and state taxing
jurisdictions,180 each with a different tax rate. Understandably, an inter-
state seller who must collect use tax may, despite its best efforts, find itself
liable for tax deficiencies.
C. States Will Lose Substantial Revenues
Another aspect of the physical presence test is that, as Net sales in-
180. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 313 n.6 (1992). The Court has historically
struck down the multiple local taxation of interstate commerce. See Western Live Stock v.
Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 256 (1938) ("[W]ithout the protection of the commerce
clause [interstate commerce] would bear cumulative burdens not imposed on local commerce.").
The Court in both National Bellas Hess and Quill, acknowledged that the complexity and sheer
number of taxing jurisdictions might easily place an undue burden upon interstate commerce.
Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 313 n.6; National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S.
753, 759-60 (1967). Providing further explanation, the Court in National Bellas Hess noted that
"many variations in rates of tax, in allowable exemptions, and in administrative and record.
keeping requirements could entangle National's interstate business in a virtual welter of compli.
cated obligations to local jurisdictions.... ." National Bellas Hess, Inc., 386 U.S. at 759-60.
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crease, states will lose substantial sales and use tax revenues. States that
do not have an income tax will experience the greatest losses. 8' As a
result, states such as Texas have begun to tax Net services and the use of
telephone lines." 2 Congress has addressed the symptoms of this national
problem with the Internet Tax Freedom Act,183 which places a four-year
moratorium on additional Net taxes.' This bill treats only the symptom,
not the problem. Despite urgings from the Court, Congress has repeat-
edly failed to pass comprehensive federal legislation in this area.1
85
To bend the inflexible requirements of the physical presence test,
some have sought to expand or redefine the definition of physical pres-
ence.'86 The representational nexus theory, for example, shifts focus to
an agent of the seller in an attempt to overcome the substantial nexus
problem presented in Quil. Under the representational nexus test, a
commercial on-line service, 8 7 telecommunications provider 88 or banking
and financial system89 is designated as the seller's agent. These entities
will most likely have physical presence in the taxing state even if the
seller does not. The representational nexus theory has not, however, met
with much success. Net service providers and banks may support the
seller's business, but they do not perform services on its' behalf.
One author has suggested that state legislatures merely expand the defi-
nition of physical presence to include "virtual presence."'" This proposal,
181. The following states do not collect an income tax: Alaska, Florida, New Hampshire,
Nevada, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, and Wyoming. Y
182. TEX. TAX CODE ANN §§ 151.0101 and 151.0035 (West 1998); 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE
3.342 (West 1998); Nineteen other states have enacted similar exactions. Steve Forbes, Don't
Strangle this Baby with Taxes, FORBES, Feb. 23, 1998, at 27.
183. Internet Tax Freedom Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, §1101, 112 Stat. 2681, 822
(1998).
184. Internet Tax Freedom Act §1101.
185. See Ichel, supra note 17, at 660-63.
186. See Ashraf, supra note 30, at 621-29.
187. Id. at 622-24. This theory is based on the idea that the service provider acts as the
seller's in-state representative. Id. at 622. The argument fails because the service provider
merely delivers the seller's information as the postal service delivers catalogues. Id. at 622-23.
188. Id. at 624-26. Under this concept, the telecommunications company that supports and
facilitates Net transmissions is deemed to be the agent of the seller. Like the argument con-
cerning service providers, this argument fails because the telecommunications company only
transmits information. Id. at 625.
189. Id. at 626-27. Like service providers and telecommunication companies, banks also
facilitate the seller's business through credit card payment systems. Id. at 626. Banks, however,
do not act on behalf of, or promote the seller's business. Id.
190. Id. at 627-29. "By changing and expanding the definition of physical presence, and in
effect equating nonphysical presence in a state with physical presence, the state legislative bod-
ies would be writing the constitutional requirement of physical presence out of existence." Id. at
628.
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however, is really based on an argument for economic presence and
would not withstand a challenge under Quill. "Virtual presence" means
that a seller does not have physical presence in the state but does enough
business in that state over the Net to warrant exacting a tax.
VI. RESOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM wrTH QuILL
At the heart of the Quill decision lies the question of when a state
can compel a nonresident seller to collect and remit use tax. An effective
solution to this problem would give sellers notice regarding collection
responsibilities, minimize the administrative burden on nonlocal sellers,
provide equitable treatment to all merchants, and preserve the revenues
of the taxing state. The following discussion explores two judicial and
two legislative solutions.
A. Adopt a Due Process "Minimum Contacts" Standard
One suggestion, which was offered by the North Dakota Supreme
Court in Heitkamp v. Quill, Corp., 191 is to utilize an economic presence
standard. The court proposed a "flexible substantive approach," which
would involve a review of "the totality of the circumstances, on a case-
by-case basis, with special emphasis upon the economic realities pre-
sented."' 92 Adoption of an economic presence standard would eliminate
preferential treatment of out-of-state sellers. In addition, it would main-
tain state use tax revenues by targeting businesses that have a significant
economic impact in the state. Allowing decisions to be made on an indi-
vidual basis, however, would only add to the uncertainty surrounding use
tax obligations. This standard fails to provide guidance for either the
business world or the judiciary.
B. Keep the "Physical Presence" Standard
Another possibility is to retain the physical presence standard enun-
ciated in Quill. Physical presence clearly establishes the boundaries of a
191. 470 N.W.2d 203 (N.D. 1991).
192. Heitkamp v. Quill Corp., 470 N.W.2d 203, 214 (N.D. 1991).
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state's taxing authority. As discussed, however, this standard produces
inequitable results when applied to electronic commerce. Keeping physi-
cal presence as the determinative factor in allocating use tax collection
responsibilities would place local sellers at a disadvantage. In addition, a
physical presence requirement would diminish state use tax revenues as
sales over the Net increase.
C. Keep Sales Tax and Require Sellers To Submit Informational Returns
A possible legislative solution is to require all out-of-state sellers to
file informational returns. This would lessen the administrative burden
on the seller and eliminate the threat of deficiency judgements. An in-
formational return would also benefit the taxing state by providing
enough information so that the tax may be collected from the individual
consumer. The buyer would be exempted from the tax by producing a
valid exemption certificate. Sales taxes would be unaffected and would
be collected at the place of purchase.
This alternative would provide the best legislative solution because it
would shift the burden of tax collection away from the nonresident seller
to the states themselves. A mandatory informational return would also
give sellers notice of their use tax obligations.
D. Abolish Sales Tax and Require All Sellers To Collect Flat Rate Use Tax
Finally, Congress may choose to eliminate sales tax and allow states
to collect a flat rate use tax. Treating all transactions as out of state
would end the disparate treatment between local and nonlocal sellers.
All vendors would understand that they are responsible for collecting and
remitting the tax. Moreover, the adoption of a flat rate tax would ease
the administrative burden on sellers. No longer would states be able to
add a county use tax rate. The rate of tax paid would depend upon where
the goods were shipped, which sellers could easily track.
CONCLUSION
At present, the issue raised in Quill remains unanswered. Although
the Court has attempted to develop a standard by which a state may
compel an out-of-state seller to collect use tax, these efforts have fallen
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short of a workable solution. On the hand, the adoption of an economic
presence test or due process analysis fails to provide a definitive rule cm-
ceming use tax collection liability. On the other hand, Quill's physical
presence requirement lacks the flexibility necessary to address the nm-
physical characteristics of Net sales.
The best way to reach a balanced solution that protects the interests
of both sellers and states is through the legislature. One approach would
be to relieve nonlocal sellers from collection liability by requiring only
informational returns. Another would be to eliminate sales tax and have
sellers remit a flat rate use tax based on the shipment destination. Un-
fortunately, Congress has yet to enact this type of legislation. However
Congress chooses to solve this dilemma, the problem of collecting use tax
on Net transactions will only get worse if no action is taken.
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